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ADMIRALTY.
Collision.-When a port-tacked vessel has thrown herself into stays
and becomes helpless, she ought nevertheless to execute any practicable
manceuvre in order to get out of the way of a starboard-tacked vessel:
Wilson v. Canada Shipping Company, Law Rep., 2 App. Cas.
A starboard-tacked vessel, when apprised of the helpless condition
of a vessel which, by the ordinary rules of navigation, ought to get out
of her way, is bound to execute any practicable manmuvre which would
tend to avoid a collision in this case :- Id.
Both vessels were held to blame for the collision: Id.
ADVANCEMENT.
When presumed.-Where real estate is conveyed by a father to a
child, the legal presumption is that it was intended to be an advance-
meat, which is greatly strengthened when the value of the land bears
any considerable proportion to the father's whole estate; and to over-
come this presumption there must be proof of distinct explanatory facts:
Storey's Appeal, 2 Norris.
In 1843, C. conveyed td his niece certain land, the consideration for
which was a sum due by C. to D., who was the niece's grandfather. The
niece Was a child and orphan, and became a member of C.'s family,
where she was reared and educated. When the conveyance was made,.
D. told C. "it would help to support and educate her," and said, "he
was to pay C. for her raising." C. maintained the niece from i'fancy
to womanhood, and the estate conveyed to her remained untouched. Its
value was about one-third of what she was entitled to from her grand-
father's estate: Held (reversing the court below), that this was not a
gift, but an advancement: I.
Where a grandfather gave to his grandson, to enable him to engage in
a permanent business, a sum of money equal to two-thirds of the grand-
son's share in the grandfather's estate, and nothing was said or done at the
time the money was transferred or afterwards, to clearly indicate what
was the intention of the donor, the purpose to which the money was to
be devoted and its amount were enough to create an implication that the
gift was intended as an advancement: Id.
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BANKRUPTCY. See Bills and .Notes.
BILLS AND NOTES.
Assignment of-Defence against Ilolder.-The debtor of a bank, of
which A. was cashier, transfbrred a negotiable, note, in payment of his
indebtedness, to A. by special endorsement, and thereupon the bank, to
enable A. to bring suit thereon, assigned its interest in the note to him.
11(l, that A. might maintain an action on the note in his own name,
notwithstanding he may be accountable to the bank for the proceeds
when collected: l'hite v. Stanley, 29 Ohio St.
Such endorsement and transfer having been made before maturity of
the note, the same in the hands of A. is not subject to any defence of
which neither he nor the bank had notice at the date of the transfer : Id.
Frand on Vaker-Aegligence.-In an action against the maker, by
an endorsee of a negotiable promissory note, who purchased the same,
for a valuable consideration, before maturity, and without notice of any
fraud or infirmity as between the original parties, the defendant is not
liable where it is shown 
:
1. That at the time of signing and delivering the note, he was induced,
by fraudulent representations as to the character of the paper, to believe
that he was signing and delivering an instrument other than a promis-
sory note:
2. That his ignorance of the true character of the paper was not
attributable, in whole or in part, to his own negligence in the premises:
Dec (amp v. Ilamma. 29 Ohio St.
Notice-Address of Drawer-Bankruptcq.-It is sufficient for the
holder of a dishonored bill of exchange to give notice of dishonor to
the drawer himself, even though before the dishonor he has been adjudi-
cated a bankrupt, and a trustee of his property has been appointed : Ex
parte Baker. In re Bellman, Law Rep., 4 Chanc. Div.
The holder of a bill of exchange which was dishonored after the
appointment of a trustee in bankruptcy of the drawer, sent notice of
the dishonor to the drawer by post to the address which he had left for
some months. Ifeld, that that address being the only one with which
the holder was acquainted, the notice was sufficient : Id.
The holder was, therefore, allowed to prove in the bankruptcy in
respect to the bill: Id.
COMMON CARRIER.
.regligence.-Where a box improperly directed was delivered to a
railroad company for transportation and was safely carried to its desti-
nation, and there, after having been securely kept for two months, and
due diligence exercised to ascertain the consignee, was delivered, by
reason of the improper direction, to the wrong person, the company was
not liable for the loss: Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Railway v.
flodapp, 2 Norris.
CORPORATION.
Action by one Stockholder against Directors -An individual stock-
holder cannot maintain a separate action at law against the directors of
a corporation for damages sustained by reason of the negligence of the
directors. The remedy of the stockholder must be in a form to protect
.626
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
the interests of the corporation as the trustee of all the stockholders and
the creditors: Craig v. Gregg et al., 2 Norris.
Piblic Corporation- Ultra Vires-Liability.-A public corporation
cannot be sued for the damages resulting from an act which is ultra
vires : Wheeler v. Essez Public Road Beard, 10 Vroom.
By force of the constitution of this state, a public corporation, exer-
cising lawfully the state's right of eminent domain, is not required,
unless the legislature has so ordered, to pay for the land taken, before
taking possession of it; contra, when so taken by a private corpora-
tion : .Td.
A road board, having the power, widened a public avenue, and in so
doing, embraced the mill-dam of the plaintiff; took down such dam,
and in lieu of it, built another dam outside of the area of the highway
and on land owned by a third party. Such dam so constructed having
given way, the plaintiff was deprived, for some time, of the use of the
water in his pond: field, that an action for such damage would not
lie, as the building of the substituted dam was ultra vires: Id.
CRIMINALJ LAW.
False Pretences-Sale of Goods-C£omniendation-Msstatement of
Nature of Goods.-On an indictment for obtaining money by false pre-
tences, it was proved that the prisoner, a travelling hawker, represented
to the prosecutor's wife that he was a tea-dealer from Leicester, and
induced her to buy certain packages, which he stated to contain good
tea, but three-fourths of the contents of which was not tea at all, but a
mixture of substances unfit to drink and deleterious to health. The
jury found that the prisoner knew the real nature of the contents of the
packages, that it was not tea, but a mixture of articles unfit for drink,
and that he designedly, falsely pretended that it was good tea with
intent to defraud; and the prisoner was convicted. Held, that the con-
viction was right : The Queen v. Foster, Law Rep., 2 Q. B. D., C. C. R.
Larceny-Receiving-Buisband and Wife-Adultery.-A wife, though
she may have committed adultery, cannot steal her husband's goods;
and therefore the adulterer receiving from her .tbe goods which she has
taken from her husband, cannot be guilty of receiving stolen goods:
The Queen v. Kenny, Law Rep., 2 Q. B. D., C. C. R.
Murder-Insanity-Burden of Proof.-In an indictment for murder,
where the defence was insanity, it was error in the court to instruct the
jury that they must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the
prisoner was insane at the time the act was committed: Meyers v. The
Commonwealth. 2 Norris.
This instruction was too stringent, and threw the prisoner upon a
degree of proof beyond the legal measure of his defence, which measure
is simply pr6of that is satisfactory; such as flows fairly from a prepon-
derance of the evidence: .d.
Murder.-Where, in the trial of an indictment for murder, the evi-
dence showed that the prisoner had had time to act deliberately, and
had not acted under a sudden gust of passion, and it appeared that he
had been on very bad terms with the deceased: Held, that all the ingre-
dients of murder in the first degree were proved, and the case- was pro-
perly submitted to the jury: Green v. Commonwealth, 2 Norris.
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If there be time to frame in the mind fully and consciously the inten-
tion to kill, and to select the weapon or means of death, and to think
and know beforehand (though the time be short) the use to be made of
it., there is time to premeditate and deliberate: Id.
DAMAGES.
Delay--Loss of .arket.-Where, on account of defects in the ship,
the voyage has been protracted, and in the meantime the market price
of the goods shipped had fallen : held, reversing the judgment of the
admiralty division, that the consignee could not recover damages for the
loss of market: The Parana, Law Rep., 2 P. D. (C. A.).
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR.
Assignment of Debt.-An assignment of a debt carries with it all the
remedies and securities which the assignor had, but does not include a
personal right of action founded on a tort which the assignor had against
a third party, although adising from the same subject-matter: Morri,for
use of Rupp, v. HM Culoch, 2 Norris.
ERROR.
Documentary Eidence must be produced to Court-Presumption.-
Plaintiff below declared upon a policy of insurance. The plea was the
general issue, with notice of special matter of defence. The questions
raised and sought to be reviewed all grew out of what was claimed to be
a written application and the effect thereof, and certain written instru-
ments introduced on the trial, and the terms of the policy sued upon,
yet neither the policy, the application, nor any of the papers put in evi-
dence appeared in or were in any way made a part of the printed bill of
exceptions. Beld, that it will not be presumed that plaintiff in error
was injured by rulings upon instruments which are not shown to the
court, and where no means are afforded of ascertaining their contents:
State Insurance Co. of Lansing v. Reynolds, S. C. Mich. January Term
1877.
EVIDENCE.
Refreshing Memory-Entries checked by Witness at the Vme--Joint
Stock Company-Evidence of its Eistenc.-The prisoner was a time.
keeper, and T. C. was pay-clerk, in the employment of a colliery com-
pany. It was the duty of the prisoner every fortnight to give a list of
the days' work by the workmen to a clerk who entered the days and the
wages due in respect of them in a time-book. At pay-time it was the
duty of the prisoner to read out from the time-book the number of days'
work by each workman to T. C., who paid the wages accordingly. And
T. C. saw the entries in the time-book while the prisoner was reading
them out. Upon the trial of an indictment charging the prisoner with
obtaining money by false pretences: held, that T. C. might refresh his
memory by referring to the entries in the time-book in order to prove
the sums paid by him to workmen. The prisoner being charged with
obtaining by false pretenses the moneys of the company: held, that the
existence of the company was sufficiently proved by evidence that it had
carried on business as such: 2he Queen v. Langton, Law Rep., 2 Q. B.
D. (C. C. I.)
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Self-defence in Criminal 1Prosecution.-ln a criminal prosecution,
where the defendant seeks to justify on the ground of self-defence, it is
not competent to give in evidence the opinion of a witness as to the
existence of danger to life, or of great bodily harm, or that such danger
might have been reasonably apprehended by the defendant: State of
Ohio v. Rhoads, 29 Ohio St.
EXECUTION.
Team-Levy on single Horse- Other su.fficient eam-.Apprasal-
Selection.-Plaintiff in error, as deputy sheriff, seized a horse belonging
to Packer, on an attachment, and the latter replevied, claiming it as
exempt. It was claimed by the officer that Packer had another horse
and harness, and that the two horses and harness were worth more than
the amount exempted by the statute; also that this was a trotting horse,
and had been kept in training for that purpose. The court below
charged that under the undisputed facts the plaintiff was entitled to
recover. Held, that this ruling was correct; that the plaintiff was en-
titled to exemption for a team, and that if the officer claimed that what
he had which would answer that designation was of greater value than
the statute exemption, he should have levied on the whole and had it
appraised, to give opportunity for the selection provided for by the
statute: Ostrander v. Packer, S. C. Mich., January Term 1877.
FRAUDS, STATUTE OF.
Parol Gift of Land.-To take a parol gift or sale of land between
father and son out of the operation of the Statute of Frauds, the evi-
dence thereof must be direct, express and unambiguous; its terms must
be clearly defined, and all' the acts necessary to its validity must have
special reference to it and nothing else: Shellhamer et al. v. Ashbaugh,
2 Norris.
Where title to land is asserted under an alleged parol purchase, to
take the contract out of the operation of the Statute of Frauds, it must
be supported by adequate evidence of an existing- consideration, an
adjustment of the boundaries of the land, and of the change of posses-
sion which the law requires: Id.
Debt of Another- Original Promise-Several Liability- Charge to
the Jury.-Mariin sued Welch for the value of meat furnished, by him
to be used in a boarding train upon the D. L. & L. M. Railroad. It ap-
peared that one Cook, who was engaged in keeping such boarding car,
had obtained his supply of meat from plaintiff, and in June 1875, was
owing him therefor $117.78; that about June 14th, he refused to trust
Cook any longer; that Welch, who had been supplying Cook with groce-
ries, went with Cook to see Marvin, and the latter claimed Welch stated
to him that the pay from the railroad company had been assigned to him,
and that he would be responsible and pay for the meat thereafter fur-
nished to run the train, and that for the existing indebtedness to Marvin
it was arranged that Cook should give an order on Welch to be paid as
fast as money came into Welch's hands; that such an order was obtained
and accepted by Welch on condition that money enough came into his
hands to pay his own account first; that different amounts were paid by
Welch, in all $215; but it did not appear that any other orders were
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given. It also appeared that in Septembcr, Marvin receivea an order
from Cook on the railroad company flr $100, which he endeavored to
collect. Marvin continued to charge the meat to Cook on his books
after the arrangement with Welch, precisely as he had done before.
There was considerable conflict in the evidence. The court left it to the
jury to determine what the agreement was between the parties. De-
fendant's counsel asked the following instruction: '-If the jury find that
Marvin sold Meat to Cook, and charged the same to Cook, and that
*Welch became responsible for it, in order to take the promise out of the
Statute of Frauds, and make Welch legally liable, they must also find
that Marvin thereupon absolutely discharged Cook from liability, and
looked only to Welch for pay." Other similar charges were requested,
and all were refused, the jury being merely instructed that the manner
of keeping the accounts, and the efforts to collect from Cook, were facts
capable of explanation, and might be considered by the jury: Held, that
defendant was entitled to have the jury instructed as requested ; that
under no theory of this case could Cook and Welch both be responsible
to plaintiff, severally at his option, since if Cook, after the arrangement
with Welch, continued liable, then Welch's liability could not be an
original one, and if Welch's promise was an original one, and the debt
his debt, then Cook could not be held liable thereon ; that while the
parties might have made an agreement under which they would have
been jointly liable, which is not claimed in this case, yet they could not,
under the circumstances, be severally liable at plaintiff's option: .Narvin
v. Welch et al., S. C. Mich., January Term 1877.
GUARANTY.
Inability to collect-Condition precedent to r-ecovery against Guaran-
tor-Declaration-Effect of Pleading to Aerits.-In an action against
a guarantor, it is essential to prove a state of facts which establishes ina-
bility to collect of the principal debtors, one and all; and such inability
may undoubtedly be proved by showing a prosecution seasonably begun,
and diligently and in good faith carried on against all to final judgment
and execution, without avail: Aldrich v. Chubb, S. C. Mich., June
Term 1877.
A defendant is not at liberty, after having neglected to demur, and
having pleaded to the merits, to turn his adversary out of court, on the
trial, on account of formal defects in the declaration : Id.
HUSBAND AND WIFE.
Check to ffusband:-Presnrnpmion of Gft.-M. G., to whom a legacy
had been bequeathed to her separate use, received an uncrossed country
banker's draft, payable in London, for the amount, less the duty, and
she endorsed the draft and handed it over to her husband, and his
bankers received the amount, and placed it, by his direction, to his
deposit account. The husband died suddenly a few days after. There
was evidence pointinz to the fact that the wife did not intend to give
the check to her husband. In an action against his executors: .Held,
that the widow was entitled to be paid the sum claimed : Green, v. Car-
lill, Law Rep., 4 Chan. Div.
Divorce- Consanguinity-First- Cousins-Marriage illegal by the Law
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of Dornicle.-The petitioner and respondent, Portuguese subjects and
first-cousins, came to reside in England in 1858. In IS66 they went
through a form of marriage befbre the registrar of the district of the
city of London. In 1873 they returned to Portugal, and continued to
reside there. By the law of Portugal a marriage of Portuguese sub-
jects, being first-cousins, without dispensation, wheresoever contracted,
is invalid: field, that the court of the place of contract of marriage is
not bound to recognise the incapacities affixed by the law of the domi-
cile on the parties to a contract of marriage, if such incapacities do not
exist according to the lex loci contractus, and pronounce a marriage,
otherwise valid, to be null and void by reason of such incapacity: Sot-
tomayor, otherwise De Barros v. De Barros, Law Rep., 2 P. D.
INSURANCE.
Aharine.-A policy of insurance was effected on ship from 22d of
January 1872, to the 23d of January 1873, both inclusive. These
words were written in, on a printed form, which also contained, in print,
the words, "at and from," and "for this present voyage," and other
similar woids which were commonly found in the forms of a voyage
policy, and which had not been erased or struck through: Held, that
the policy was really a time police, and its character was not affected by
the printed words thus negligently left in the form: Dudgeon v. Fen-
broke, Law Rep., 2 App. Gas.
In a time policy the law, in the absence of special stipulations in the
contract, does not imply any warranty that the vessel should be sea-
worthy: Gibson v. Small, 4 11. L. C. 353, supplemented by Tliomp-
son v. Hopper, 6 El. & BI. 172, and Faucus v. ,Sarsfield, Id. 192, de-
clared to have set at rest all controversies on this subject : Id.
If a ship-owner knowifigly and wilfully sends his ship to sea in an
unseaworthy condition, the'knowledge and wilfulness are essential ele-
ments in the consideration of his claim to recover: .d.
Breach of Conditons.-A condition of a policy of insurance upon the
merchandise of a store stipulated that no petroleum should be kept or
had on the premises. The insured kept a barrel of petroleum at a time
for sale, and the company claimed this avoided the policy. The court
below instructed the jury that "merchandise" included whatever it was
customary to keep in such a store, and if a supply of petroleum such as
was kept on the premises was a part of the usual stock of the store the
plaintiff could recover. Held to be error: Birmingham Fire Ins. Co. v.
.Kroegher, 2 Norris.
,Held further, that the effect of the condition of the policy V as not
changed by the fact that the agent of the company knew that petroleum
was kept on the premises at the time the insurance was effected: Id.
WTaiver o.Defence.-In an action against an insurance company to
recover the amount of a fire policy, a defence on the ground that the
insured failed to make and furnish the insurer with the preliminary
proofs of loss in the manner and within the time required by the policy,
is not waived by setting up and relying upon other defences not incon-
sistent therewith : Farmers' Ins. Co. v. Frick, 29 Ohio St.
Policy- Waiver of Conditions or Representations- Trial-Examina-
tion of Witnesses.-Although a proposal and application for a" policy of
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life insurance, contains an agreement on the part of the insured, that the
answer to the questions annexed to them, and the accompanying state-
ments made to the examining physician, shall be the basis and form part
of the contract and policy between the insured and the company, yet if
the policy does not, directly or indirectly, so declare, it will be assumed
that all previous negotiations have been superseded, and that the policy
alone expresses the contract between the parties: American Popular
Life Ins. Co. v. Day, Executor, 10 Vroom.
The fact that the policy declares that the insurance is in consideration
of the representations made to the company in the application for the
policy, cannot have the effect o*f changing the character of the represent-
ations in the application, and elevating them to the importance of war-
ranties or conditions of insurance : Id.
LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF.
Acknowledgment of Debt-Implied Promise to pay.-The defendant,
whose debt to the plaintiff was barred by the Statute of Limitations,
wrote to the plaiutiff within six years before action the following letter:
"I return to Shepperton about Easter. If you send me there the par-
ticulars of your account with vouchers, I shall have it examined and
check sent to you for the amount due; but you must be under some
great mistake in supposing that the amount due to you is anything like
the sum you now claim." Held, that the debt was revived, as the
request to be furnished with an account with vouchers at a particular
time and place did not negative the implied promise to pay arising from
the admission of a balance due: Skeet v. Lindsay, Law Rep., 2 Ex. D.
Pleading-Demurrer-Payments endorsed on back of Note -Since
the adoption of the code, as before it, the bar of the Statute of Limita-
tions must be pleaded, otherwise it is waived. But since the code, the
bar may be insisted on by demurrer when it appears upon the face of the
pleading demurred to, that the time of the statute has run against the
cause of action therein stated : Vose v. Woodford, 29 Ohio St.
Where a petition, which contains a good cause of action, except that
it appears to be barred by the statute, is demurred to, and the defend-
ant afterward, pending the demurrer, answers to the merits, and an issue
of fact is joined thereon and trial had, the demurrer must be taken to
have been waived: Id.
A petition against several makers of a joint and several note more than
fifteen years past due, whereon payments have been made within the
time of the statute, but by whom paid not appearing, does not show a
statutory bar in favor of any of the defendants: d.
Where the holder of a note past due receives from the principal debtor,
without the knowledge of the surety, a sum of money greater than the
amount of interest then due, and the amount so received is endorsed on
the note as received on account of interest, it not appearing that such
endorsement was made by the holder or that he had knowledge that the
same was so made, it is not error to refuse to charge the jury that, in
law such receipts and endorsement constituted an agreement to extend
the time of payment of the note for such period of time as such sum
would pay interest: Id.
PANDAMUS.
Nfonsnt- F'evious Nonsuit- Order setting. same aside on payment of
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Costs--Noticingfor Trial- Waiver- Costs.-A writ of mandamus was
asked to require the respondent to set aside a nonsuit. A previous non-
suit had been granted, which, on motion, was ordered set aside on the
payment of costs. The defendant, without taxing costs or demanding
payment, noticed the case for trial, and had it placed on the docket.
When it was reached, a nonsuit was again granted. The plaintiff moved
to set it aside, on the ground that the case was not in condition to be
noticed for trial, showing that he was ready and willing to pay the costs
when taxed : Held, 1. That when the defendant noticed the cause for
trial, this was in law a waiver of the previous nonsuit, and plaintiff was
entitled to proceed to a trial on such notice. 2. That if plaintiff was
in doubt regarding the waiver, it was his duty, knowing the case had
been placed on the trial docket, to move to strike it off, if he intended
to dispute its right to be there ; and that he, having failed to do this,
the Circuit judge was justified in considering the case as standing regu-
larly for trial: The People ex rel. Wineman v. The Judge of the Wayne
Circuit, S. C. Mich., January Term 1877.
MASTER AND SERVANT.
Who is Fellow-servant.-A master is not liable to a servant for the
negligence of a fellow-servant, while the two are engaged in the same
common employment, unless for negligence in the selection of the
servant in fault, or in retaining him after notice of his incompetency:
McAndrews v. Burns, Administratrix, 10 Vroom.
A fellow-servant is any one who serves and is controlled by the same
master. Common employment is service of such kind that, in the
exercise of ordinary sagacity, all who engage in it may be able to foresee,
when accepting it, that through the negligence of fellow-servants it may
probably expose them to injury : Id.
A. not liable for the Negligence of his Servant while employed under
the control of B.-The defendants, having begun sinking a shaft in their
colliery, for which purpose they had fixed an engine near the mouth of
the shaft, agreed with W. to do the sinking and excavating at a certain
price per yard, W. to find all the labor, the defendants to provide and
place at the disposal of W. the necessary engine power, ropes and hop-
pets, with an engineer to work the engine (who was employed and paid
by the defendants), the engine and engineer to be under the control of
W. The plaintiff, who was one of the men employed and paid by W.,
while working at the bottom of the shaft, was injured by the negligence
of the engineer : leld (affirming the judgment of the Common Pleas
Division), that though the engineer remained the general servant of de-
fendants, yet being under the orders and control of W. at the time of
the accident, he was acting as the servant of W., and not of defendants,
who were therefore not liable for his negligence : Bourke v. White Moss
Oolliery Comipany, Law Rep., 2 C. P. D., C. A.
MINE.
Lease of Coal-Damage to Lessor's Estate by working a .Aine.-A
lease which gives the right to take out all the coal beneath a certain
surface, qonfers also the right to make all necessary openings to reach
the coal: Trout v. McDonald, 2 Norris.
T. made a voluntary conveyance of a farm to his wife, in '1867, but
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remained in possession of the property till his death, in June 1873. In
April 1873, he granted to Mc). the right to mine coal on a part of this
farm. MeD. worked a mine, under the lease, during T.'s lifetime and
after his death, with the widow's knowledge. MeD. never knew of the
existence of this deed till July 1874. It was not recorded till August
1874. After the husband's death, his widow received payments of
royalty under the lease, but afterwards filed a bill to restrain McD. from
entering upon the property to mine coal: Held (affirming the court
below), that she had ratified and confirmed the lease, and was bound by
it: Id.
Whether she might have avoided the lease after her husband's death
was not decided: Id.
The fact that a mere "wet-weather" spring might be injured by
working the mine is not important. Even if it was a valuable spring,
it seems that its destruction, if a necessary incident to. mining under
the lease, would be damnum absque i*juria: Id.
NATIONAL BANK.
Mortgage- When Mtra Vires.-A mortgage given to a-National bank
to secure a future loan is ultra vires and therefore void: Woods v. Peo-
ples' Nat. Bank, 2 Norris.
A mortgage given to a National bank to secure a pre-existing debt is
valid : Id.
Where a mortgage was given to a National bank partly to secure cer-
tain pre-existing notes, upon which W. was an accommodation endorser,
and partly to secure a future loan, Held, that the mortgage was void as
to the future loan, and that W. had a right to have the proceeds of a
sale of the mortgaged premises under the mortgage applied to the pay-
ment of the notes of which he was endorser: Id.
NEGLIGENCE. See Nuisance; Railroad.
Master and Servant-Coal Grate in Highway.-The carman of the
defendant, a coal merchant, for the purpose of delivering coals at the
premises of a customer, removed an iron plate in the footway which cov-
ered an opening communicating with the coal cellar. The plaintiff was
passing along the footway at the time. The carman gave her no warning
that the plate was taken up, and in consequence of his negligence in not
taking due precautions, without any want of due care on her part, she
fell into the opening and sustained injuries : Held, in an action against
the defendant for negligence, that he was responsible : Wkitelcy and
Wife v. Pepper, Law Rep., 2 Q. B. D.
NUISANCE.
Duty and Liability of Owners of Adjoining Premises.-The plain-
tiff and the defendant were respectively occupiers of adjoining houses.
An old drain which commenced on the defendant's premises, and thence
passed under and received the drainage of several other houses, turned
back under the defendant's house, and thence under the cellar of the
plaintiff's house, and ultimately into a public sewer. The part of the
return-drain which passed through the defendant's premises being de-
cayed, the sewage escaped and flowing into the plaintiff's cellar did
damage. The defendant was unaware of the existence of this return-
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drain, and consequently of its want of repair: Held, that the defend-
ant was liable for the damage done to the plaintiff, for the defendant's
duty was to keep fhe sewage, which he himself was bound to receive,
from passing from his own premises to the plaintiff's premises otherwise
than along the old accustomed channel, and that this duty was inde-
pendent of negligence on his part, and independent of his knowledge or
ignorance of the existence of the drain : Humphries v. Cousins, Law Rep.
2 0. P. D.
PARTNERSHIP.
Liability of new Partner for old Debts.-The members of a firm doing
a banking business under the name of "The Citizens' Bank," are not
dormant partners, and are all individually liable for the debts of the firm;
and a member of such a partnership, upon withdrawing from it, must
give notice of his withdrawal as in the ease of ordinary partnerships;
otherwise he remains liable fbr the subsequent debts of the firm : Sham-
burg v. Ruggles, 2 Norris.
A new partner entering a firm ia not liable for the antecedent debts
of the firm, unless he has agreed to assume them: Id.
Where S. joined an association doing a banking business as -1 The
Citizens' Bank" some months after it was formed, and became a director
in it, and when he withdrew, in December 1872, no notice was given of
his withdrawal, but, on the contrary, his connection with the bank as a
director continued to be advertised, though against his wishes, till June
1873 : Held, that he was liable for a deposit made in January 1873,
although the depositor had never known that he had been a member of
the firm: fiel, in the absence of any evidence thiat he assumed the
debt, that he was not liable for a deposit made before he became a part-
ner, and that the payment of interest on such deposit while S. was a
partner, even with his knowledge, was not, of itself, enough to show that
he had assumed the antecedent debts of the firm : .d.
I Execution.--B., an individual judgment-creditor of M., issued a fi. fa.
against him, to which writ the sheriff returned "that he had levied on
all the interest of M. in the business and property of M. & Sons, and
subsequently sold said property as that of M. & Sons, under executions
against the firm." The fund arising from the sale under the execution
against the partnership was referred to an auditor for distribution, before
whom B. claimed the amount of his judgment out of the proceeds, and
offered evidence to show that no partnership existed, but that the pro-
perty belonged to M. alone : .ield (reversing the court below), that the
auditor could not inquire into the existence of the partnership, and that
B. was concluded by the return to his writ, and estopped from making
any claim-to the fund: Bogue's Appeal, 2 Norris.
Change of Partners under same Style of Firm.-Prior to April 1872,
a firm of bankers, consisting of two partners A. and B., received mopey
on deposit at interest, for which they gave deposit notes in the usual
form to the depositors, who, when the amount on deposit was increased
or diminished, gave up their old notes and received fresh ones for the
new amount. In April 1872, X. and Y. were admitted into the part-
nership, and notice of the change in the firm was given to the depositors.
A fortnight afterwards A. died, and the business was carried on under
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the same firm by B., X. and Y. In 1874 B. died, and the business was
carried on by X. and Y., still under the s'ame firm, until 1S75, when
the bank stopped payment, and went into liquidation. The depositors
all knew of A.'s death, and none of them made any claim against
his estate. 3 ome of them had not altered the amount of their deposit,
but retained the notes they had received in his lifetime. They had,
however, received interest from X. and Y. Others had increased and
others had diminished the amount of their deposit after A's death, re-
ceiving in each case fresh deposit notes; and they had all proved in
the bankruptcy of X. and Y. for the amount due on their notes as
money " advanced and lent" to the bankrupts. Ihih, that in each case
there had been a complete novation. and that none of the depositors
were entitled to prove against the estate of A. : Bilborough v. Holmes,
Law Rep. (V. C. H.), 5 Oh. D.
PRACTICE.
Rule to Plead-Clerical Error-otice Serced-Stattte of Amedl-
ment.-M. sued I. et al., by declaration. The rule to plead, by an
error of the clerk, was worded to require the defendant to plead in ten
days instead of twenty days after service. The notice endorsed on the
declaration served, however, was one of twenty days. Default was not
entered until after twenty days after service, and on the basis of this
defiult judgment was afterwards in due course entered. H. etal. claimed
the judgment to be erroneous on account of the defect in the rule to plead :
HIel, that the notice served being regular, and the proceedings being in
accordance therewith, the clerical mistake in the entered rule was imma-
terial, and worked no prejudice to plaintiffs in error, and that the defect
was cured by the Statute of Amendments : Howe et al. v. Maltz, S. C.
Mich., January Term 1877.
PUBLIC SCHOOLS.
Control over 1 7ils.-Boards of education are authorized by law to
adopt and enforce necessary rules and regulations for the government of
the schools under their management and control: Sewell v. Board of.
Eciteation, 29 Ohio St.
Where instruction in rhetoric was given in any grade or department
of such schools, and one of the rules adopted by the board for the gov-
ernment of the pupils therein provided that if any pupil should fail to
be prepared with a rhetorical exercise, at the time appointed therefor,
lie or she should, unless excused on account of sickness or other reason-
able cause, be immediately suspended from such department: Held, that
such rule was reasonable: Id.
Where the teacher of such department, with the consent of the board,
for a failure to comply with the rule, or to offer any excuse therefor, sus-
pended a pupil, until he should comply with the rule, or offer a reason-
able excuse for his non-compliance, neither the board of education nor
the teacher is liable in damages therefor: Id.
RAILROAD.
.Xregqlence Liability to Stranger.-A railroad company is not liable
for an injury to a person resulting from its failure to exercise ordinary
skill and care in the erection or maintenance of its station-house, where,
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at the time of receiving the injury, such person was at such staition.
house by mere permission and sufferance, and not for the purpose of
transacting any business with the company or its agents, or on any
business connected with the operation of the road: Pittsburgh, P. IW & C.
Railwaty Co. v. Bingham, 29 Ohio St.
.Vegligence, when a Question for Jury-Duty of Comlpany to maintain
Oider on its Trains-Proximate and Remote Ceause.-The plaintiff was
a passenger by the defendants' railway; and at one station, though all the
seats in the carriage in which the plaintiff was were filled, three more
persons got in and stood up. There was no evidence that the defend-
ants' servants were aware of this ; but the plaintiff remonstrated with
the persons who had so got in. At the next station the door of the
carriage was opened by persons who tried to get in, and the plaintiff
rose and held up his hand to prevent them. After the train had started,
a porter pushed away the persons who were trying to get in, and slammed
the door, which caught and injured the hand of the plaintiff, who had
been thrown forward by the motion of the train : ield (on appeal), by
COCKBURN, C. J., and AMPHLET , J. A. (KELLY, C. B., and BEA11-
WELL, J. A., dissenting), that there was evidence from which the jury
uight infer negligence on the part of the defendants so as to entitle the
plaintiff to recover damages: Jackson, v. .ietropolitan Railway Co.,
Law Rep., 2 C. P. D. (C. A.)
Negligence- Combustible MAatter near its Tracks-Duty of Adjacent
Owners.-A railroad company is bound to keep its track free from com-
bustible matter, whereby fire may be communicated from its locomotives
to adjoining property. Negligence in suffering combustible matter to
accumulate on its right of way, Ao as to make it dangerous to adjoining
property to run its locomotives through it, will make the company liable
for injuries from fires originating in such combustible matter from coals
dropped or thrown from its locomotives, and carried thereby to adjoining
property, though there be no allegation that the engine from which the
coals were dropped or thrown was improperly constructed or driven:
Delaware, Lackawanna & Western Railroad Ob. v. Salmon, 10 Vroom.
The owner of lands adjacent to a railroad is not obliged to keep his
lands contiguous to the track free from leaves or other combustible
matter coming or being thereon. He may cultivate, build upon, and
use his lands, or leave them in a state of nature, as he may sde proper,
and will take upon himself no other risks than such as are incident to
the operation of the road with proper care by the company, and will,
nevertheless, be entitled to damages for injuries by fire, arising from the
negligence of the company in the construction or management of its
locomotives or in the condition in which its track is suffered to re-
rhain : Id.
Nor will such owner be barred of recovery of damages for injury by
fires caused, by the negligence of the company, by the fact that the
company acquired the right of way through his land by grant or con-
demnation. A conveyance of land for railroad purposes, or an assess-
ment of the value of lands taken, and damages under proceedings
to condemn, only bars the recovery of such damages as naturally and
necessarily arise from the use of the premises for the authorized pur-
pose, and will not bar the recovery of damages for injuries arising from
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an unskilful or improper construction, or negligence in operating the
road. For such dauiages the remedy by action remains, notwithstanding
the conveyance or condemnation : Id.
By a provision in the charter of a railroad company, its road was
declared to be a public highway for the use of steam-engines and cars
propelled by steam-engines only : lid, that the company was liable
for injuries from fire thrown by the locomotive of another company
which the defendants suffered and permitted to be run on the road
without any spark-arrester on it, its defective condition being known to
the defendants' train-desnatcher, who exercised no supervision over
it : 11.
Where one, by negligence or misconduct, occasions a fire on his own
premises, or the premises of a third person, which spreads from thence
to the plaintiff's property, and causes an injury, the injury is not, as a
legl proposition, too far removed from his negligent act to involve him
in legal liability: Ry an v. N Y. Central Railroad Co., 35 N. Y. 210,
and Penna. Railroad Co. v. Kerr, 62 Penna. 353, disapproved : Id.
In actions for injuries resulting from fire originating through the
defendant's negligence, and communicated to the plaintiff's property,
where distance, intervening objects, or the manner in which the fire
was communicated, present the question whether the plaintiff's loss is
attributable to the defendant's negligent act, and there be no intervening
agency apparent which may stand in law as the immediate cause of the
injury, the question is one for the jury whether, under all the conditions
under which the loss happened, the destruction of the plaintiff's pro-
perty was a result that might reasonably have been expected-though
not, in fact, anticipated-from the defendant's negligent act: Md.
SALE.
Damages for Aron-delivery-Counter-claim.-Where damages for the
failure to deliver goods sold are sought to be set up by way of counter-
claim by the purchaser, the answer, which shows that delivery of the
goods and payment therefor were concurrent conditions, without aver-
ring an offer or readiness to pay on his part, does not state facts sufficient
to constitute a counter-claim: Chambers v. Frazier, 29 Ohio St.
Where nominal damages only can be assessed on a counter-claim, with-
out proof of actual damages, the omission to assess any damages, there
being no proof of actual loss, is not ground for a reversal when such
omission does not affect the costs : Id.
SHIPPING.
Charter Party. Cesser of Liabilty-Demurrage-Lien.-Defendants
chartered plaintiff's ship to carry a cargo of rice to a good and safe port,
calling at another port for orders which were to be forwarded within
forty-eight hours after notice of her arrival or laydays to count. Twelve
working laying-days to be allowed the freighters for loading the ship at
port of loading and waiting for orders at port of call, fifteen days on
demurrage allowed over and above the laying-days, at 4d. per ton per
day. It was .further agreed " that the liability of the charterers shall
cease as soon as the cargo is on board, provided the same is worth the
freight at port of discharge, but the owners of the ship to have an abso-
lute lien on the cargo for all freight, dead freight, and demurrage, which
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they should be bound to exercise." The ship arrived at tne port of
call with a cargo worth, the freight, and notice was given to the defend
ants. In an action against the charterers (who had sold the cargo before
arrival at the port of call), two breaches of contract were assigned : 1.
That the defendants did not give orders as to the ship's port of discharge;
2. That they gave orders for the ship to discharge at a port which was
not a good and safe port; whereby the plaintiffs were delayed and put
to expense in obtaining payment of the freight: Held, affirming the
judgment of the Common Pleas Division, that the exoneration clause
discharged the defendants from liability for the breaches: French v.
Gerber, Law Rep., 2 0. P. D. (C. A.) 247.
SURETY.
Co-sureties-Discharge of one.-W., to procure a line of discount for
the firm of which he and his brother were the members, executed to a
bank a mortgage of his individual real estate. The security of this
mortgage being deemed insufficient, .the mother of W. executed a mort-
gage of her real estate to provide further protection to the bank. The
condition of each mortgage was to secure the payment of the notes to
be discounted for the firm to an amount not to exceed $25,000. Notes
to the amount of $20,000 being held by the bank, on the payment of
$10,000 by W. his mortgage was satisfied without the knowledge of his
mother, and the firm having subsequently fiiled suit was then brought
by the bank on her mortgage to recover the amount of the residue of
the notes unpaid. Held, that the relation of defendant to the parties
and the transaction was that of surety -f W. alone, and she had the
right to require that the value of the property covered by the lien of
the mortgage of W. should be exhausted before recourse could be had to
her mortgage : Wharton v. Duncan, 2 Norris.
.Held, further, that the relation of co-sureties did not subsist between
W. and the defendant and the liability of.each to the plaintiff was there-
fore not equal: Id.
TITLE.
State Lands- Certificate of Purchase-Forfeiture-Redemption--
Assignment-Forger.-In 1865, Benjamin F. Bush became the pur-
chaser of 120 acres of laud, paying to the state land office one-fourth of
the purchase-money, and receiving the usual certificate. He died in
1866. In October 1869, the land was offered for sale as land which
had become forfeited, and complainant, in October 28th 1869, bid it off,
and paid to the state treasurer $120, by means whereof he became, as
lie avers, entitled in one year thereafter to a certificate of purchase if
the land was not redeemed. On November 13th 1869, the land was
redeemed by James A. Smith. Complainant was at once notified of the
fact, and thit his payment would be refunded on surrender of his bid.
December 31st 1870, he was again notified to surrender his bid and take
his money, as it was necessary to close up that kind of business on the
books. A similar notice was sent him in November 1873. May 18th
1871, defendant, claiming to hold the Bush title through several mesne
assignments, paid up the amount remaining due on the purchase-money,
and on the next day received his patent. This suit was brought in
August 1874, to compel an assigment to complainant of the patented
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lands, on the ground tnat the titles set up under Bush were derived
under a forged assignment, and were therefore void, and gave no right
to redeem the lands from complainant's purchase. James A. Smith,
when he redeemed, was guardian of the heirs of Bush. Held, that
Smith was entitled to redeem in one capacity or the other, and that
Bush's heirs, who were not parties to this controversy, could not now be
precluded from any rights they bad; that if the Bush transfer was forged
the heirs were entitled to the land, and if not forged, then the redemption
enured to the holders of the Bush title, and in either case it was suffi-
cient to cut off complainant's right to the land: Johnson v. Knapp, S.
C. Mich., January Term 1877.
TRIAL.
Practice-Reading Opinions to Jury.-It is error in the judge, at the
trial, to permit counsel, in his summing up, to read to the jury the
remarks of the court in the opinion read at bar, on a motion for a new
trial in the same case, touching the weight of evidence or the credibility
of the witnesses: Allaire's Heirs v. Allaire, 10 Vroom.
But an objection, at the trial, to the reading of such opinion, is too
broad, as such opinion, with respect to the law stated in it, could be
lawfully read to the jury. It must appear, to render the exception
available in the bill of exceptions, that the attention of the judge was
drawn to the point by the objection being confined to that portion of the
reading which was deemed illegal : Id.
Evidence-Discretion of Judge.-Reasonable discretion must be ac-
corded to a judge at nisi prius, in allowing or overruling questions to
witnesses on direct examination, which inquire as to matter not in itself
pertinent, and which can only become so by the introduction of other
evidence which is clearly pertinent: Am. Popular Ins. Co. v. Day, 10
Yroom.
WILL.
Revocation offormer Wilt by conditional Wil which does not operate.-
The deceased made a will, by which he left all his property to his wife
and made her sole executrix. He subsequently, with his wife. executed
a joint will, which was expressed to take effect in case they should be
called out of the world at one and the same time and by one and the
same accident. By this will they revoked all former wills. The deceased
died in the lifetime of his wife : Held, that the joint will was dependent
upon a contingency which did not happen, and was, therefore, inopera-
tive even to revoke a previous will: In the Goods of Hugo, Law Rep., 2
P. D.
-ho residuary or revocatory OlMuses-Earlier Wlt aisposing of the
whole of the Property.-The deceased executed a will in 1858, by which
she disposed of the whole of her property. In 1860 she executed another
will, which commenced, "This is the last will and testament," &c. It
varied and repeated various bequests given in the first will, appointed
the same executors for England as in that document, but contained no
residuary nor revocatory clauses : Held. that from the general tenor of
the last will, it was clear that the testatrix did not intend the first will
to remain in force, and that it, therefore, was revoked: Dempsey v.
Lawson, Law Rep., 2 P. D.
